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Abstract
Young children can be motivated to help adults by sympathetic concern based upon empathy, but the underlying
mechanisms are unknown. One account of empathy-based sympathetic helping in adults states that it arises due to direct-
matching mirror-system mechanisms which allow the observer to vicariously experience the situation of the individual in
need of help. This mechanism could not account for helping of a geometric-shape agent lacking human-isomorphic body-
parts. Here 17-month-olds observed a ball-shaped non-human agent trying to reach a goal but failing because it was
blocked by a barrier. Infants helped the agent by lifting it over the barrier. They performed this action less frequently in a
control condition in which the barrier could not be construed as blocking the agent. Direct matching is therefore not
required for motivating helping in infants, indicating that at least some of our early helpful tendencies do not depend on
human-specific mechanisms. Empathy-based mechanisms that do not require direct-matching provide one plausible basis
for the observed helping. A second possibility is that rather than being based on empathy, the observed helping occurred
as a result of a goal-contagion process in which the infants were primed with the unfulfilled goal.
Citation: Kenward B, Gredeba¨ck G (2013) Infants Help a Non-Human Agent. PLoS ONE 8(9): e75130. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075130
Editor: Andrew Bremner, Goldsmiths, University of London, United Kingdom
Received February 1, 2013; Accepted August 9, 2013; Published September 18, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Kenward, Gredeba¨ck. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Fund) Grant P2008-01039:1. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: ben.kenward@wolfson.oxon.org
Introduction
From early in their second year children help adults unable to
reach their goals [1–4]. Motivations for prosocial behaviour in
young children are diverse [5–7], but one important motivation
for helping in young children is an intrinsic sympathy-based
feeling of altruism towards the individual in need of help [8–10].
This is demonstrated by studies showing that from 18 months
children are more likely to help victims of anti-social acts [11,12]
and that helping is inhibited rather than promoted by rewards in
20-month-olds [13]. Furthermore, 24-months-old’s physiological
arousal produced in response to an individual in need is reduced
not only when the children provide the necessary help, but also
when help is provided by a third party, indicating that help is
motivated by a basic sympathetic concern for the individual’s
welfare [14].
Although motivations for young children’s helping are therefore
beginning to be understood, the underlying neural mechanisms
remain unclear. To explain empathy in adults, and thus sympathy
and helping, one prominent type of mechanistic account invokes
the mirror system. (Empathy refers to the sharing of an emotion
with another, whereas sympathy refers to the feeling of concern for
another’s wellbeing which can be evoked by empathy, and which
can motivate helping [15]). The mirror system is highly complex
and includes numerous different pathways which might support
empathy [16–20], but here we focus on just one frequently
highlighted type of mirror activity known as direct matching.
We use the term direct-matching as originally defined, as a
‘‘mechanism that directly maps a pictorial or kinematic description
of the observed action onto an internal motor representation of the
same action’’ [21] (see also [22,23]). In other words, an observed
action is represented by an action plan for performing the same
action. It is argued that ‘‘the precise kinesthetic aspects of the
movement (for example, how much the finger should be lifted)’’
are encoded [21].
Direct matching is known to play a causal role in social
understanding [24]. One specific way in which it might enable
empathy is by enabling observers’ perceptions of others’ facial
expressions to be directly linked to the experience of displaying the
same expression [25–27]. A more general mechanism by which
direct matching might lead to helping is that direct matching
assists the observer to empathically and vicariously experience an
observed challenging situation, with the experience of empathy
leading to sympathy and thus a desire to help [9,28,29]. Molnar-
Szakacs explains the link between direct matching and empathy
thus: ‘‘Empathic emotional attunement appears to rely on the
direct link between perception and action instantiated by the
human MNS [mirror neuron system]. As perceiving an action
activates the same representations as performance of the same
action, this overlap might allow humans to ‘embody’ the behavior
of others and to infer their internal states, including the intentions
and emotions driving [them]’’ [29]. According to the direct
matching account of empathic helping, therefore, direct matching
enables empathy, which leads to sympathy and a consequent
desire to help.
Given the above arguments, we postulate that it is plausible
that direct-matching is a prerequisite for helping in infants,
because it is not certain that any other neural mechanisms for
empathic and non-empathic helping are operational in infancy.
The purpose of the current study is to test this strong
hypothesis. It makes the strong prediction that infants would
not help a geometric-shape agent lacking human-isomorphic
body-parts because such an agent cannot elicit direct matching
which by definition requires at least some degree of isomor-
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phism of movable body parts [22]. This prediction has not to
our knowledge been tested, but it is not implausible that infants
might help such an agent. The extraction of social meaning
from the movements of geometric-shape agents begins in early
infancy [30–32]. Infants evaluate such agents’ helpful acts as
positive and hindering acts as negative [33–35] (but see [36]),
with even three-month-olds possessing the rudiments of this
ability [37]. These results indicate that mechanisms independent
of direct-matching are important for infants’ social cognition.
However, as the mirror system is also active in infants [38], and
as active helping may not be based on the same systems as
evaluation of others’ helping, it remains unclear what underly-
ing neural mechanisms motivate infants’ own acts of helping.
Furthermore, although empathy is clearly an important moti-
vator for helping in young children, it is also possible that
mechanisms not based on empathy might play a role. It may be
that a goal-contagion priming account [39] might explain some
aspects of infant helping. According to this account, which is
addressed further in the discussion, the encoding of an agent’s
goal leads to the adoption of the same goal in a priming process
akin to automatic imitation.
Here, in the experimental condition, a geometric-shape
agent’s apparent goal is on the other side of a barrier. On
reaching the barrier the agent first travels up and down the
length of it and then repeatedly knocks into it as if attempting
to force a way through. Infants can help the agent by lifting it
over the barrier. Only accounts of helping not requiring direct
matching predict that infants will do so. The numerous
explanations for why infants might lift the agent over without
intending to help it, such as exploratory behaviour, are
controlled for in a condition in which everything is identical
except that the barrier is incomplete. In this condition the
agent’s identical action of travelling up and down is instead
intended to indicate that there is a clear passage to the other
side which the agent chooses not to take. Unlike in the
experimental condition, there is therefore no obvious intended
unsuccessful action. As infants are therefore much less likely to
perceive an unfulfilled goal, hypotheses of helping do not
predict that infants will lift the agent beyond the barrier,
because this would not fulfil an incomplete action. In summary,
if mechanisms motivating helping without direct matching exist,
infants are predicted to lift the agent over the barrier when the
barrier is complete, but to do so less frequently when the
barrier is incomplete. Because the hypothesis of imitative goal
contagion predicts that infants re-enact the agent’s original




The work conducted in this study was given written approval by
the Uppsala Regional Ethics Committee (Regionala etikpro¨v-
ningsna¨mnden i Uppsala, application reference number 2009/
103). Infants’ parents gave informed written consent.
Participants
Sixty 17-month-olds (27 girls; mean age 17.5, SD= .7) were
randomly divided between the experimental or control conditions.
An additional 7 infants were excluded from analysis because of
parental interference (1), technical problems (2), or because of
fussiness before a minimum criteria of three trials were reached (5).
Prior to the experiment, all parents were informed that we were
interested in whether infants would help, but not that there were
two conditions.
Procedure
Each infant participated until it became fussy or until six trials
were completed. Each trial was identical and began with the infant
sitting in the parent’s lap just out of reach of the table. Parents held
their infants around the waist only. The table was divided into two
by a barrier composed of three wooden blocks in the experimental
condition, but in the control condition only the central wooden
block was present (Figure 1). This was the only difference between
conditions. A screen attached to the back of the table hid the
experimenter as she sat behind moving the agent using a magnet
under the table. The agent, a slightly elongated yellow ball with
fabric eyes and small enough for infants to lift, was initially
positioned to the left of the barrier. On the right side was a larger
pink ball with fabric eyes, positioned on a pink shape, besides
which was an unoccupied yellow shape intended to enhance the
impression of an intended goal for the yellow agent. The gap
between the blocks was one third of the diameter of the agent –
from three months infants do not expect objects to pass through
gaps smaller than themselves [40].
Trials began with the agent travelling towards the central block,
and on reaching its left side, travelling up and down the table.
With identical movements, therefore, in the experimental condi-
tion the agent travelled up and down the length of the barrier,
whereas in the control condition the agent moved past the empty
spaces to the sides of the central block. After this the agent began
to knock, hard and at speed, into the central block, with each
knock followed by a slower backwards retreat (Videos S1 and S2
show the experimental and control conditions respectively). Each
knock came from a slightly different angle, serving to reinforce the
impression of agency rather than mechanical movement [41].
Parents were instructed to move forward after five knocks so that
their infant could reach the agent. After this point, knocking
continued until the infant began moving the agent or until 15
seconds had passed, at which latter point the trial was terminated.
Once the infant had begun moving the agent, the trial was
terminated either when the infant ceased contacting the agent or
after an additional 15 seconds. After the trial, the experimenter
retrieved the agent, the parent rotated the chair so the infant could
Figure 1. Infants’ view at the start of the trial. (A) Experimental
condition. (B) Control condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075130.g001
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not see the table, and the experimenter replaced the agent in the
starting position.
Stimulus Validity
To confirm that adults at least readily interpreted the agent
in the experimental condition as an agent attempting to cross
the barrier and in need of help, but made this interpretation
less readily in the control condition, a convenience sample of 15
hypothesis-blind non-psychologist adults (mean age 44 years,
SD=11, 7 women) was recruited and tested via the internet.
Participants were displayed movies of both conditions in
counterbalanced order (Videos S1 and S2), and after each
movie were asked ‘‘what is your immediate intuitive interpre-
tation of what you just saw?’’ and ‘‘if you could intervene in
this situation, what would you do?’’ One subject was excluded
for stating only that the movies were ‘‘silly’’. All 14 adults
described the agent as an agent in both conditions. The agent
was marginally more likely to be described as attempting to
travel past the barrier in the experimental condition (100%)
than in the control condition (64%), p= .074, McNemar’s test.
Adults were more likely to state they would help the agent past
the barrier in the experimental condition (100%) than in the
control condition (57%), p= .041, McNemar’s test. Adults were
marginally more likely to state that the agent’s goal was to
knock the barrier in the control condition (36%) than in the
experimental condition (0%), p= .062, McNemar’s test.
Coding and Analysis
Two coders, one of whom was blind to the study hypothesis,
coded each trial from video. The following behaviours were coded:
whether the infant moved the agent beyond the barrier (defined as
leaving the agent on the table to the right of the right-hand edge of
the central block; for inter-observer agreement Cohen’s k= .95);
whether the infant placed the agent on the yellow shape beyond
the barrier (k= .95); whether the infant moved the agent at all
(k= .91); and whether the infant replicated the agent’s original
actions (defined as knocking it into the barrier or sliding it
rhythmically back and forth on the table; k= .64). The blind
coding was used for analysis.
Two-sample t-tests were conducted using Welch’s standard
correction for possible non-homogeneity of variance. Because data
was in the form of proportions and left-skewed due to many zero
values, non-parametric two-sample permutation tests were also
conducted. The standard method was used of comparing the t-
statistic with a null-hypothesis distribution generated by randomly
permuting the data, rather than with the parametric null-
hypothesis distribution [42]. To generate the permutation null-
hypothesis distribution, the standard method was used: the two
samples were pooled and then divided into two randomly selected
samples one million times, with the randomised t-statistic
calculated each time.
Results
Moving the agent beyond the barrier occurred on a higher
proportion of trials in the experimental condition (Table 1,
Figure 2). Video S3 shows an infant in the experimental condition
lifting the agent over the barrier. The same result was obtained
when the number of trials each infant lifted the agent over the
barrier was expressed as a proportion of trials in which the infant
moved the agent, instead of as a proportion of trials the infant
completed (Table 1). The agent was moved beyond the barrier at
least once by 40% of participants in the experimental condition
and 23% of participants in the control condition. No significant
difference was detected in the proportion of trials the agent was
lifted beyond the barrier in which the agent was placed on the
yellow shape, although sample sizes were small due to the low
frequencies of lifting over the barrier (Table 1). Re-enactment of
the agent’s original actions was very infrequent in both conditions
(Table 1).
There was no evidence that the conditions differed in how they
engaged the participants’ attention and activity. The mean
proportion of trials completed before fussiness was the same for
both conditions, and no difference was detected in the proportion
of completed trials in which the infant moved the agent (Table 1).
Discussion
Although moving the agent beyond the barrier was infrequent
compared to moving the agent in other ways, it did occur, and
importantly, it occurred much more frequently in the experimen-
tal condition than in the control condition. Although there are
many other reasons apart from helping (such as exploration) for
why infants might move the agent beyond the barrier, these
reasons generally apply equally to the control condition. It is not
impossible to conceive of non-help-based hypotheses which might
explain the condition difference – for example it may be inherently
more rewarding to lift a ball past three blocks than past one – but
such post-hoc hypotheses lack the plausibility conferred on the
helping hypothesis by previous results concerning infants’ helpful
tendencies and interpretations of non-human goal-directed action.
Note also that our analysis of general exploratory behaviour did
not indicate differences between the conditions. We therefore
conclude that at least some of the observed transportations over
the barrier were motivated by a tendency to help, by which we
mean a tendency to act in a way facilitating the achievement of
another individual’s goal.
Based on the conclusion that infants helped a non-human agent,
the following further conclusions about the underlying mecha-
nisms of helping can be made. The results cannot be explained by
the direct-matching mirror account of empathy-based helping,
and direct-matching mirror mechanisms are therefore not the only
and perhaps not even the primary mechanisms for motivating help
in infants. This does not, however, imply that direct-matching
Figure 2. Mean percentage of trials participant moves agent beyond barrier, by condition. Error bars show one standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075130.g002
Infants Help a Non-Human Agent
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e75130
mirror mechanisms do not play a role when infants help human
agents. It should be noted that in comparison to rates of helping of
adult strangers by 18-month-olds [43], the rates of helping
observed here were very low. While we have established that
direct-matching is not a prerequisite for helping in infants, the
finding that helping rates are comparatively low for a non-human
agent suggests that human-specific mechanisms such as direct
matching are likely to play an important role in motivating helping
of humans. Such human-specific mechanisms might relate to
action understanding, empathy, and/or sympathy. It should also
be noted that instrumental helping is found at 14 months [1], and
helpful communication at 12 months [4], so our findings in 17-
month-olds do not necessarily speak to the very earliest forms of
helping. As the relatively low rates of helping here imply that
human specific mechanisms are likely to be important at 17
months, it is plausible that helping before 17 months does rely on
human specific mechanisms.
Our findings further reinforce the point that direct matching is
not a prerequisite for understanding others’ actions in infants and
adults [44–47]. It is also relevant to note that although the issue is
still a subject of much debate [23], recent studies have questioned
the extent to which direct matching occurs and the extent to which
it plays a causal role in action understanding [48–50]. For
example, nine-month-olds have been demonstrated to show motor
activation when observing actions they could not themselves
perform, suggesting that some forms of matching may be the
consequence of planning an action similar but not identical to the
one observed, rather than the cause of understanding the action
[51]. Motor activation, including forms of mirror activity which
are not direct-matching, is therefore not ruled out here as being
involved in participants’ interpretations of the agent’s actions.
What mechanisms did therefore account for the observed
helping? Some prior observations allow informed speculation.
Many neural mechanisms involved in empathy in adults and older
children do not involve direct matching [17,18,52], and it is likely
that these may play a role in infancy. More specifically, aspects of
empathy depend on connections between emotion centres
(particularly the amygdala, the insula, and the anterior cingulate
cortex) and the prefrontal cortex, both in older children [53] and
in adults [54–56]. We note that the amygdala also plays a key
causal role in allowing the actions of animated geometric-shapes to
be evaluated in terms of social meaning (known as anthropomor-
phizing [57]). We suggest therefore that a plausible account of
empathy for and thus helping of geometric-shape agents is based
upon a network with the amygdala at its centre, because the
amygdala plays a key role both in perceiving such agents’
movements as actions with social meaning, and in assigning
emotional valence to these actions.
A second possible explanation for the observed helping is a non-
sympathy-based priming mechanism. The representation of the
observed goal may have primed behaviour resulting in that goal, in
a similar process to the goal contagion which has been observed in
adults [39]. Note that in this case, helping can be seen as a similar
process to automatic imitation [58]. Observation of non-human
action primes motor activity in nine-month-olds [51], priming can
increase helping frequency in 18-month-olds [59], and 18-month-
olds are known to be able to imitate complete actions even when
demonstrated incompletely [60]. Related to this, it has been
argued that when young children observe unmet needs, they can
sometimes be motivated to help not because of sympathy but
because of a broader motivation to cause goals to be reached
which is not predicated on an understanding of the self-other
distinction [61]. One result, however, speaks against the goal-
priming account. If goal-priming led to imitation of a non-human
agent’s actions by infants, re-enactment of the agent’s original
actions would be expected, at least in the control condition where
there was no obvious incomplete action. Such re-enactment was
observed only at very low frequencies, suggesting that goal-
priming may not have been a strong motivator of the infants’
actions.
An issue concerning the validity of the method must be raised.
Parents in both conditions were informed that we were
investigating if infants would help the agent. Parents were not
aware of condition differences, and were asked not to influence
their infants’ behaviour. However, as adults also report that they
would be more likely to lift the agent over the barrier in the
experimental condition, some parents might have attempted to
cause their infants to do so. Parents held their infants around the
Table 1. Proportions of trials containing specific behaviours.
Experiment Control
M SD n M SD n t d.f. pt-test ppermutation d
Proportion of trials in which the infant
moved
the agent beyond the barrier
.15 .21 30 .05 .11 30 2.14 42 .039 .039 .55
Proportion of trials in which the infant
moved
the agent in which the agent was
moved beyond the barrier
.21 .29 27 .07 .13 26 2.18 51 .034 .032 .60
Proportion of trials in which
the infant moved the agent beyond the
barrier in which the infant
placed the agent on the yellow square
.44 .54 12 .21 .39 7 1.16 14 .264 .289 .54
Proportion of trials completed before
fussiness
.97 .08 30 .96 .08 30 0.26 58 .795 1.000 .07
Proportion of trials in which the
infant moved the agent
.72 .33 30 .59 .37 30 1.47 57 .148 .149 .38
Proportion of trials in which the infant
re-enacted the agent’s original actions
.06 .14 30 .06 .18 30 0.03 55 .979 .949 .01
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075130.t001
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waist only and advanced and retreated from the table only at
predetermined points. It would therefore have been challenging
for them to influence the details of their infants’ manipulation of
the agent. More plausibly parents might have been able to
influence whether their infants picked up the agent, but no
condition difference was detected, indicating that parental
influence was unlikely to differ between conditions. Further, any
undetected difference in influence on picking up could not have
entirely accounted for differences in lifting over the barrier
because it was more frequent in the experimental condition even
when expressed as a proportion of trials in which the agent was
picked up. Although we therefore argue that parental influence is
an unlikely explanation for our result, future designs should
remove this possibility entirely, for example by blindfolding
parents.
In conclusion, the finding that non-direct-matching-based
mechanisms can result in helping in infants gives further support
to the idea that they play a prominent role more generally in
human helping behaviour [17,18,52]. What this study most clearly
demonstrates is that by late infancy humans’ helpful tendencies are
built not only upon direct-matching mirror mechanisms in which
others are perceived as ‘‘like me’’ [62], but also on more general
mechanisms which can process non-human agents and their
unachieved goals.
Supporting Information
Video S1 Infants’ view of the experimental condition.
(MOV)
Video S2 Infants’ view of the control condition.
(MOV)
Video S3 An infant in the experimental condition lifting
the agent over the barrier. The parent of the participant in
this video has given written informed consent, as outlined in the
PLOS consent form, to publish this video.
(MOV)
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